INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THEIR DETERRENT EFFECT
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.60787/aasd.vol3no1.75Keywords:
International sanctions, Deterrence, Diplomacy, Economic coercion, GeopoliticsAbstract
The first and second world war had exposed humanity to the huge cost and burden of war, hence, statesmen and world leaders have come to embrace sanctions as a potent weapon to deter or punish aggressors and bring them to knee without the actual use of military force. Despite their frequent use since the First World War, there is little consensus as to whether sanctions can be effective in deterring undesirable actions such as aggression, human rights violations or nuclear proliferation. Through a historical analysis of case studies from the League of Nations’ sanctions in the interwar period to modern multilateral sanctions targeting Iran, North Korea, and Russia, this paper interrogates the effectiveness of sanctions as means to prevent threats to international peace and security. It assesses the impact of sanctions on state behaviour, exploring the complex interplay between diplomatic pressure, economic coercion, and geopolitical interests. The paper concludes that while sanctions may serve symbolic and punitive purposes, it yields limited success under specific conditions and their effectiveness as deterrent is inconsistent, context-dependent, and often accompanied by unintended consequences. By evaluating the successes and failures of sanctions in achieving their intended objectives, this paper calls for a more nuanced understanding of when and how sanctions work as instruments of international deterrence.
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